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Abstract This paper employs meta-analysis to aggregate and systematically analyze
the mixed empirical evidence on the determinants of corporate hedging reported in
132 previously published studies covering data from more than 73,000 firms. Among
the fourteen proxy variables analyzed by multivariate meta-analysis, three variables
emerge as reliable explanatory factors for corporate hedging decisions supporting the
bankruptcy and financial distress hypothesis: dividend yield (positive sign), liquidity
(negative sign), and firm size (positive sign). Moreover, for tax-loss carry forwards
(positive sign) and research and development (positive sign), our findings indicate a
weak impact on corporate hedging behavior reflecting tax reasons, the coordination
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between financing and investment, and agency conflicts between shareholders and
debtholders. Regarding the asymmetric information and agency conflicts of equity
hypothesis, we find no explanatory power. The further analysis of heterogeneity via
meta-regression reveals several factors that determine the mixed empirical evidence
reported in previous studies. First, the results indicate that studies analyzing firms
from North America report, on average, a lower impact of leverage on the corporate
hedging decision. Moreover, studies examining more recent data samples tend to find
a weaker relation between tangible assets and hedging, R&D and hedging, respec-
tively. Overall, our results encourage scientific research to put more emphasis on
finer-grained examinations of hedging variations and to discover rationales of cor-
porate hedging extending classical financial theories.
Keywords Corporate hedging  Corporate risk management  Derivatives 
Meta-analysis
1 Introduction
Themotivation for non-financial firms to engage in corporate hedging is one of themost
intensively discussed topics in corporate finance research. Neoclassical finance theory
claims that under the conditions of a perfect capital market, hedging on the firm level
does not create additional value, since shareholders can perfectly hedge their position
(Modigliani andMiller 1958).However,more recentfinancial theory suggests thatwhen
financial markets are not frictionless, there are several ways through which corporate
hedging can increase firm value in the sense of the maximization of shareholder value
(Bessembinder 1991; DeMarzo and Duffie 1991; Froot et al. 1993; Smith and Stulz
1985). In this manner, hundreds of primary studies have empirically investigated the
theoretical explanations for corporate hedging. However, despite or perhaps exactly
because of the vast amount of studies, the empirical literature presents rather mixed
evidence for the drivers of corporate hedging (Aretz and Bartram 2010; Bartram et al.
2009; Fauver and Naranjo 2010; Judge 2007).
Two previous studies present quantitative summaries of the existing empirical
findings for the hedging determinants (Aretz et al. 2007; Arnold et al. 2014). Aretz
and Bartram (2010) conduct a broad literature review and apply vote counting to
compare the number of statistically significant and insignificant results from the
univariate/multivariate analysis sections reported in 31 primary studies. Their findings
show weak evidence for the coordination of financing and investment policy
hypothesis as well as the tax hypothesis. Although these results exhibit a detailed
summary of the distribution and the extent of disagreement within the outcomes of
prior research, vote counting approaches have been strongly criticized as ‘fatally
flawed’ (Borenstein et al. 2009: 252; Stanley and Doucouliagos 2012: 2). This
assessment arises from the fact that vote counts collapse the observed estimates into a
few categories based on their statistical significance, do not present an economic
magnitude for the aggregated effects, and ignore differences of sample sizes and
precision of the findings reported in the primary studies (see, among others,
Borenstein et al. 2009; Hedges and Olkin 1985; Stanley and Doucouliagos 2012).
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To overcome the shortcomings of vote counting, Arnold et al. (2014) calculate
weighted averages for a set of 15 different hedging determinants across a sample of
37 primary studies. Contradicting Aretz and Bartram (2010), their main result is that
financial distress costs induce firms to hedge. In addition, they find weak evidence
that the underinvestment problem and the dependence on costly external financing
influence corporate hedging behavior. However, their univariate meta-analysis
approach bears an essential caveat, since the computation of mean values across
primary studies does not account for interactions between the examined proxy
variables. Riley (2009) shows that ignoring these dependencies in a meta-analysis
can lead to a heavily biased estimation of the aggregated results. Furthermore,
independent testing of correlated effects increases the chance of finding spuriously
significant results (Bender et al. 2008). Beyond the threat of biased estimates caused
by the assumption of uncorrelated proxy variables, none of the mentioned reviews
explores the sources of heterogeneity among the primary studies’ results. Hence,
explanations for the mixed empirical evidence are still missing. Table 1 illustrates
the contribution of this study to the existing literature and especially the two
previous reviews on the determinants of corporate hedging.
First, the field of corporate hedging is characterized by its multivariate
interrelations. For example, in the case of existing corporate taxes, a combination
of several influencing factors determines firm value creation through corporate
hedging, such as volatility of pre-tax income, convexity of the tax function, and the
amount of tax payments. For this reason, we employ the first multivariate meta-
analysis in corporate finance research. This approach simultaneously integrates
reported results for the fourteen most frequently analyzed hedging determinants
based on manually collected data from a sample of 132 primary studies. The data
availability from a sufficiently large number of studies allows to apply this
multivariate approach, which requires reported estimates for the bivariate relations
among all proxy variables. The number of articles included in this study is about
three times larger than the samples analyzed by Aretz and Bartram (2010) or Arnold
et al. (2014). In this way, we aim to comply with the requirement of any meta-
analysis to examine the population of studies available in order to avoid systematic
biases due to misspecification and publication selection while incorporating the
multidimensional nature of empirical research findings (Stanley and Doucouliagos
2012). Moreover, this comprehensive data set increases the number of observations
from different data sources and time periods, which reduces the impact of sampling
errors within individual primary studies. In a second type of analysis, we employ
meta-regression to explain the heterogeneity among the reported effect estimates by
exploring the impact of regional differences, study quality, and observation period
on the reported results. Finally, we consider the presence of a potential data mining
bias, publication selection bias, and misspecification bias. These aspects have not
been investigated in the other reviews on corporate hedging so far.
In summary, our multivariate estimates of the aggregated primary studies’ results
provide evidence for the bankruptcy and financial distress hypothesis. In this
respect, we obtain statistically significant results (at least at a significance level of
5%) for the following proxy variables: dividend yield (positive sign), liquidity
(negative sign), and firm size (positive sign). In addition, we find weak explanatory
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power for the tax-loss carry forwards variable and the research and development
(R&D) proxy (each at a significance level of 10%). This indicates weak support for
the corporate tax hypothesis and agency costs of debt argument. Furthermore, we
cannot find consistent evidence for the hypothesis that hedging alleviates
asymmetric information and agency conflicts between managers and shareholders.
Overall, these results differ from Aretz and Bartram (2010) and Arnold et al. (2014),
since the former also find evidence for the asymmetric information hypothesis and
both reviews identify some support for hedging to be driven by the motivation of
firms to avoid agency conflicts of debt. The further analyses reveal that our main
findings are robust against data mining bias and publication selection bias. Solely
the results for interest coverage ratio, capital expenditure, and R&D seem to be
slightly distorted towards reporting stronger and statistically significant results.
Moreover, the impact of financial distress costs measured by the corporate leverage
ratio are found to be less pronounced for US firms. Finally, the relation between
tangible assets and corporate hedging, as well as R&D expenses and hedging
decreases over time.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides an
overview of the four basic hypotheses of firm value creation by corporate hedging.
Section 3 serves as a short introduction to the methodology of multivariate meta-
analysis. Section 4 presents the search for literature, the data preparation, and
descriptive statistics. Section 5 reports our empirical findings, which are discussed
in the subsequent Sect. 6. Section 7 concludes.
2 Determinants of corporate hedging
By incorporating capital market imperfections, scholars have developed several
hypotheses explaining why hedging at the firm level adds value to shareholders
(e.g., Bessembinder 1991; DeMarzo and Duffie 1991; Froot et al. 1993; Smith and
Stulz 1985). These theories especially gain in importance due to the increasing
volatility in financial markets, in particular foreign exchange rates, interest rates,
and commodity prices, which drive a firm’s market value to the extent to which it
depends on the development of these risk factors (Rawls and Smithson 1990).
Following previous literature (e.g., Aretz and Bartram 2010; Arnold et al. 2014;
Guay and Kothari 2003; Kürsten 2006), the theoretical hypotheses can be
subsumed under the maximization of shareholder value. Within the shareholder
value maximization theory, we review four hypotheses that explain how corporate
hedging increases firm value by (1) reducing the corporate tax burden, (2)
lowering bankruptcy and financial distress costs, (3) mitigating asymmetric
information and agency conflicts of equity, as well as (4) improving the
coordination of financing and investment policy and alleviating agency conflicts of
debt.
As most of the theoretical arguments are not directly observable, academics make
use of proxy variables to test whether firms with properties according to the hedging
hypotheses are more likely to hedge. Table 2 sums up our analyzed proxy variables
for each of the hypotheses together with the hypothetical signs and variable
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definitions. As these variables are the standard proxies examined in the majority of
the hedging literature, we do not further discuss them. Excellent discussions of the
proxy variables are provided, among others, by Bartram et al. (2009), Géczy et al.
(1997), or Haushalter (2000).
2.1 Corporate taxes
Mayers and Smith (1982) as well as Smith and Stulz (1985) show that, if a firm
faces a convex tax function (i.e., taxes increase overproportionally with taxable
income), corporate hedging can increase post-tax firm value by reducing the
volatility of pre-tax income. This is due to Jensen’s inequality as less volatile cash







? Dummy variable that takes a value of ‘1’ if the firm has tax-loss carry
forwards available and ‘0’ otherwise
Bankruptcy and financial distress costs (H2)
Dividend yield ? Dividend per share (scaled)
Interest coverage
ratio
- (Logarithm of) Earnings before interest and taxes 7 interest expenses
Leverage ratio ? Book value of long-term or total debt (scaled)
Liquidity - Current assets or cash and cash equivalents (scaled)
Profitability - (Logarithm of) Sales or return on assets or EBIT (scaled)
Firm size ? (Logarithm of) Book value of total assets or market value of the firm
Tangible assets - Tangible assets (scaled)
Asymmetric information and agency conflicts of equity (H3)
Institutional
investors
- Percentage or number of shares held by institutional investors
Option
ownership
? (Logarithm of) Number, percentage or market value of options held by
managers or directors
Share ownership ? (Logarithm of) Number, percentage, or market value of shares held by
managers or directors
Coordination of financing and investment policy and agency conflicts of debt (H4)
Capex ? Capital expenditures (scaled)
R&D expenses ? Research and development expenses (scaled)
Tobin’s Q ? (Logarithm of) Market value of firm 7 book value of total assets
This table sums up the proxy variables reviewed in the paper at hand, including their hypothetical sign for
the impact on the corporate hedging decision, as well as the corresponding variable definition. The
hypothesized sign describes the theoretical relationship between the proxy and the incentive for corporate
hedging. Our variable definitions arise from an aggregation of the variables in the reviewed studies and
are similar to those of Aretz and Bartram (2010). The descriptions are generalizations of the study-
specific variable definitions.
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flows lead to a lower expected tax liability. Thus, we receive the following
hypothesis H1, which we test by tax-loss carry forwards as proxy variable:
H1: Firms use corporate hedging as an instrument to profit from tax advantages.
2.2 Bankruptcy and financial distress costs
Volatile future cash flows and a high leverage may induce situations in which a
firm’s liquidity is insufficient to fully meet its contractually fixed payment
obligations (Rawls and Smithson 1990). This increases the risk of bankruptcy and
the firm might encounter direct and indirect costs of financial distress (Jensen and
Meckling 1976). Since corporate hedging lowers cash flow volatility and therefore
also the default probability, it reduces expected costs of financial distress and adds
value to the firm (Brown and Toft 2002; Hahnenstein and Röder 2003; Smith and
Stulz 1985; Stulz 1996). Thus, we receive the following hypothesis H2, which we
test by dividend yield, interest coverage ratio, leverage ratio, liquidity, profitability,
firm size, and tangible assets as proxy variables:
H2: Firms use corporate hedging as an instrument to reduce the risk of
bankruptcy and financial distress costs.
2.3 Asymmetric information and agency conflicts of equity1
DeMarzo and Duffie (1991, 1995) show that information asymmetries can arise
from a manager’s proprietary information on the firm’s dividend stream. Due to
preferred managerial access to corporate information, shareholders cannot fully
replicate the firm’s hedging decision. Accordingly, under information asymmetry
firms can hedge more effectively than its shareholders. Such informational
asymmetries may result from high expenses for disseminating necessary informa-
tion to the shareholders, whereby the costs increase with firm complexity (Dolde
and Mishra 2007), or from protecting information transmission to competitors
(Marshall and Weetman 2007). By reducing the variability of the corporate cash
flow and thus lowering the noise in the firm’s dividend stream, hedging can be used
as an instrument to overcome informational asymmetries between shareholders and
managers. Hence, we receive the following hypothesis H3, which we test by
institutional investors, option ownership, and share ownership as proxy variables:
H3: Firms use corporate hedging to reduce information asymmetry and to
mitigate agency conflicts of equity.
2.4 Coordination of financing and investment policy and agency conflicts
of debt
High leverage and a low present value of the firm may give rise to the following
agency conflicts of debt, because under these conditions managers may have
1 The agency conflicts of equity hypothesis can also be derived from the maximization of manager’s
private utility theory. However, we follow Aretz and Bartram (2010), Arnold et al. (2014) and Guay
and Kothari (2003), and classify this hypothesis under the shareholder value maximization theory.
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incentives to transfer wealth from bondholders to shareholders. First, managers may
forego positive net present value projects if the expected project gains are required
to satisfy fixed payment obligations to the bondholders (Myers 1977). Corporate
hedging can relieve this problem, as a reduction of cash flow variability increases
the probability that shareholders are residual owners after reimbursing the
bondholders. Moreover, when external financing is more costly than internal
financing (Myers and Majluf 1984), firms may forgo profitable investments due to a
lack of internal funds. Froot et al. (1993) show that under this condition, corporate
hedging may be used as instrument to coordinate the availability of internal funds.
Secondly, managers acting in the best interest of shareholders may give rise to asset
substitution by replacing low-risk assets with high-risk investments (Smith and
Warner 1979). This is because shareholders’ equity positions are a call option on the
company’s assets, and high variance projects enlarge option value (Mason and
Merton 1985). However, for fixed payment receivers this exchange of assets raises
additional risk. Hence, bondholders anticipating the opportunistic behavior of
management claim higher returns or protective bond covenants, due to increasing
risk and higher agency costs (Jensen and Meckling 1976). Corporate hedging adds
value to the firm by lowering the project’s risk and accordingly diminishing agency
costs which arise from the managerial incentive of asset substitution. Campbell and
Kracaw (1990) additionally contribute that also credible commitments to hedge (for
example, obligated hedging of interest rate risks via debt covenants) reduce agency
costs of debt by lowering the incentive to asset substitution. Thus, we receive the
following hypothesis H4, which we test by capital expenditures, R&D expenses, and
Tobin’s Q as proxy variables:
H4: Firms use corporate hedging as an instrument to coordinate investment and
financing policies and to mitigate agency conflicts of debt.
3 Methodology of multivariate meta-analysis
The objective of this multivariate meta-analysis is to comprehensively test the
hedging determinants on an aggregated empirical level across a broad set of primary
studies. In detail, we investigate the relationship between fourteen proxy variables
and the corporate hedging behavior, which is modeled as a dummy variable that is
equal to one for hedgers and zero otherwise.2 As effect size measure for this
relationship we use the Pearson correlation coefficient between each proxy variable
j (j ¼ 1; . . .; pÞ and the hedging variable reported in study i (i ¼ 1; . . .; k).
2 In contrast, other studies (e.g., Belghitar et al. 2013; Graham and Rogers 2002; Knopf et al. 2002)
propose a continuous hedging variable to measure the extent of hedging (e.g., the gross notional
derivative value or the fair value of derivative contracts). However, studies using a hedging dummy
variable routinely report the descriptive statistics for hedgers and non-hedgers or a mean difference test
between both groups, consequently providing us with sufficient information to extract correlations. In
contrast, studies examining a continuous hedging variable do usually not present this information.
Moreover, the number of studies using a dummy instead of a continuous hedging variable is much higher,
and therefore a meta-analysis based on these studies yields more reliable results.
8 Business Research (2018) 11:1–31
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Due to the multidimensional behavior of the firm characteristics used as proxy
variables for the hedging hypotheses, primary studies on corporate hedging usually
test their hypotheses through multivariate analyses. These interrelations must be
considered on a meta-level as well. Thus, in addition to p correlations between the
hedging variable and each proxy variable, correlations among the proxy variables
must also be incorporated in the aggregation. In the case that all proxy variables are
investigated in each primary study, we extract p ¼ pðp 1Þ=2 correlations from
each study of interest. As the variance of the raw correlations strongly depends on
the correlation coefficient itself, all computations are performed in the variance-
stabilizing Fisher’s z-scale and are later transferred back into the correlation metric
for interpretation.
Using this correlational data as input, meta-analysis aims to derive the best effect
estimate for the unknown population correlation by calculating a weighted mean
effect across all observations from the sample studies. For the estimation of the
mean effect, we use a generalized least squares (GLS) estimator to derive the z-






Here, ẑ is a p  1 column vector containing the effect size parameters to be
estimated. X is an indicator matrix with k stacked p  p identity matrices that
show which correlations are given in each study. The weighting matrix S is a
kp  kp block-diagonal variance–covariance matrix containing the k study-
specific variance–covariance matrices Si þ T2 on its diagonal. z is a kp  1 column
vector storing the observed effect sizes p from all k studies.
In the matrix Si, the diagonal elements capture the study-specific effect size
variation and the off-diagonal elements are the estimated covariances3 among the
effect sizes. The effect-specific value T2j defines the p
  p-matrix T2. As T2j is
unknown, we apply a method of moments estimator (DerSimonian and Laird 1986).
The weights are calculated by adding T2 to each study-specific covariance-matrix
Si. This weighting scheme assigns higher weights to more precise studies.
Furthermore, T2j explicitly models the fact that the true population effect for a
certain relation is not unique, but varies across primary studies (between-study
variation). Hence, this parameter captures unobserved heterogeneity among the
reported effect sizes. A model that includes an estimate for the between-study
variance is commonly referred to as random effects model. In contrast, a fixed
effects meta-analysis model would assume that all studies share a common
population effect (Borenstein et al. 2009), which is indeed hard to justify as our
sample includes studies from different countries and time periods.4 Obviously, there
might not be a single true effect underlying all studies in the sample. To verify the
assumption of random effects, we conduct Cochran’s Q-test.
3 To estimate the covariances, we apply the large sample approximation according to Olkin and Siotani
(1976).
4 Note that the ‘fixed’ and ‘random’ effects estimators in meta-analysis do not correspond to the standard
use of these terms in panel data econometrics.
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Next, we use the estimated mean correlations ẑ from Eq. (1) to estimate a
multiple regression model with the proxy variables as predictors and the hedging
dummy as dependent variable. The standardized regression slopes in this linear
model are given according to Becker (2009):
b ¼ R1XXRXY ; ð2Þ
with b as a p 1 vector of standardized regression coefficients, and R as the GLS
estimator ẑ from Eq. (1), which is transformed back into the correlation scale and
organized as a matrix. RYX (= RXYÞ is a p 1 matrix with the correlations between
the hedging variable Y and each proxy variable X, where p is the number of proxies
used as predictors. RXX is a p p matrix capturing the correlations among the proxy
variables. Accordingly, b estimates the average impacts of the proxy variables on
the corporate hedging decision, while accounting for dependencies among the
proxies.
4 Data
We employ a comprehensive literature search to identify the full body of empirical
studies examining the determinants of corporate hedging. Our search process
consists of the following six steps5: definition of the inclusion criteria, search in
electronic databases for published literature, search for gray literature, backward
search, search in authors’ publication lists, and forward search. To comply with the
requirements of a high-quality review, we follow the Cochrane Handbook for
Systematic Reviews of Interventions as a general framework for the literature search
and the subsequent meta-analysis (Higgins and Green 2011).
4.1 Inclusion criteria
We consider only studies investigating non-financial firms because companies from
the financial sector do not necessarily use derivatives exclusively for hedging
purposes, but also for trading or speculative activities (e.g., Allayannis and Weston
2001; Gay and Nam 1998; Heaney and Winata 2005). However, we do not exclude
studies containing both financial and non-financial firms, if the sample was taken
from a broad stock market index. Moreover, the hedging proxy must be modeled as
a dummy variable in the primary studies. Additionally, we focus on studies meeting
the following criteria, which are constitutive elements for the conduction of a
multivariate meta-analysis: (1) the correlation coefficient between the proxies and
the hedging dummy should either be directly reported in the study, or otherwise
should be computable from the reported descriptive statistics6 (e.g., t-statistic from a
test of independent groups or standardized mean difference between hedgers and
non-hedgers). If there is no sufficient data available, the authors must provide us the
5 A summary of the literature search process can be found in Online Appendix A.
6 The conversion of standardized mean differences into correlations is presented in Borenstein et al.
(2009).
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required effect size data to be included in the analysis.7 (2) The study’s sample size
must be extractable to calculate the effect size variation and hence the study
weights. (3) The correlations among the proxy variables have to be stated in the
primary study. However, this is not a necessary requirement to be included, because
the direct effects between the hedging dummy and the proxies also carry useful
information for multivariate meta-analysis.8
4.2 Search strategy
We searched in four major electronic databases (ABI/INFORM Complete, Business
Source Premier, EconBiz, ScienceDirect) by adopting the same search command
used by Arnold et al. (2014).9 For each study, the title, abstract, and the content
were screened with regard to the inclusion criteria. In summary, we reached a total
number of 2,790 studies identified by the search command. After sorting the results
by the inclusion criteria, we cut the sample to 67 relevant studies.
In the next step, we explicitly searched for gray literature. By screening the
electronic working paper database SSRN (via ProQuest) and using the same search
strategy as for published articles, we received another 18 relevant studies (from an
initial sample of 808 studies). Additionally, we found six relevant studies in the
Dissertations and Theses database (ProQuest).
In the following step, we performed a backward search by screening the
reference lists of the 91 studies identified as relevant after the search in the
electronic databases. Furthermore, we screened the publication lists of the authors
appearing more than twice in our interim list from the database search. Finally, we
conducted a forward search via the ‘cited by’-option in Google Scholar. Another 76
relevant studies were identified in this step.
At the end of the search process, we reached a sample of 167 relevant primary
studies meeting the inclusion criteria—with 54 of them providing full correlation
matrices for the hedging dummy and the other proxy variables, 69 studies reporting
at least the direct effects between the proxy variables and the hedging dummy, and
44 studies with none of the required data published.10 Finally, we sent a study-
specific request mail to the authors of all studies with missing data.11 In response, 12
authors provided us with additional data. As common in meta-analysis, we treat
studies as independent, if the same authors use different data sets or different
authors use the same data set (Hunter and Schmidt 2004; Stanley and Doucouliagos
7 We sent an email request to all authors of studies with missing data.
8 If none of the studies would provide correlations between the proxies, the multivariate analysis equals
the univariate analysis.
9 Arnold et al. (2014) derived a search command for electronic databases from a sample of thirty relevant
primary studies. The search command consists of nineteen search terms linked by Boolean operators. See
Online Appendix A.
10 The list of excluded studies from the initial sample of 167 relevant studies is available on request from
the authors.
11 We sent a request email and two weeks later a reminder email to the authors of 113 studies with
missing data. 10.62% of the contacted authors delivered additional data. 22.12% rejected to provide us
with the correlational data from their study, and the remaining 67.26% did not reply to our request.
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2012). In this regard, we had to exclude 3 studies due to insufficient data or
dependencies in the sample.12 Consequently, our final sample consists of 132
primary studies.13 From this pool of studies, we manually collected 1,627 Pearson
correlation coefficients covering the relation between the fourteen hedging
determinants and the hedging dummy variable as well as the interactions among
the hedging determinants.
4.3 Data preparation
A requirement for the feasibility of multivariate meta-analysis is the estimation of
the complete correlation matrix between the proxy variables and the hedging
dummy. Thus, we consider all proxies for which the correlation with other variables
is reported in at least one study. As several of these correlations are not given in any
of the primary studies, we focus on the fourteen most frequently examined hedging
determinants (see Table 2).
As sample size for the hedgers and non-hedgers group we use the number of
firms investigated in the primary study instead of the firm year observations.14 In
some studies, we had to apply the following adjustments. First, some authors use the
opposite assignment for the hedging dummy, i.e., ‘0’ for the hedgers group and ‘1’
for the non-hedgers group. In this case, we changed the sign of the correlations.
Second, some studies report the reciprocal value of the proxy variables (e.g., book-
to-market value instead of market-to-book value). In this case, we use the reciprocal
means and estimate the variance approximation of the reciprocal elements.
Afterwards, we calculate the mean differences and convert the values to the
Pearson correlation coefficient according to Borenstein et al. (2009).
4.4 Descriptive statistics
Figure 1 depicts the distribution of the primary studies’ data samples across time
and geographical regions (each observation refers to one study).
The sample distribution over time indicates that the observed empirical effects
cover a long time horizon of more than 20 years, whereas the majority of
observations falls into the period between 1990 and 2009. In total, about a third of
the estimates is based on firm data from a single year, while the remaining part of
studies examines more than one year. The regional distribution of the collected
12 If studies use an identical sample of firms, we use each proxy variable from this sample only once.
Beside the studies from Bartram (Bartram et al. 2009; Bartram et al. 2011; Bartram Bartram 2015) and
Lin et al. (Lin et al. 2007, 2010), the studies from Nguyen and Faff (Nguyen and Faff
2002, 2006, 2007, 2010) are based on the same data sample. As the studies by Nguyen and Faff
additionally investigate similar variables, we had to exclude Nguyen and Faff (2006) and Nguyen and
Faff (2010) from our sample.
13 The studies are listed in Online Appendix B together with the study characteristics. The corresponding
references are listed in Online Appendix C.
14 If a study observes more than one year and does not provide the number of firms, we divide the total
firm year observations by the years of observation. Moreover, some primary studies report the statistics
for the proxy variables based on different samples. In this event, we use the median sample size to create
one single sample size for each study.
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estimates reveals a dominance of North American studies (45%) in the corporate
hedging literature. Nevertheless, more than half of the observations is based on data
from other geographical regions, especially from Europe (25%) and the Pacific
(11%). Consequently, there is a certain proportion of studies investigating firms
from the same country and identical or overlapping time periods (e.g., US studies
commonly examine S&P 500 firms).15 Therefore, effect sizes might be related
across studies if different authors use similar data sets. This issue cannot be fully
accounted by the multivariate meta-analysis approach. However, the wide
distribution across time weakens the threat of non-independent study results.
Moreover, we address the issue in our analysis of heterogeneity, where we explicitly
account for these two levels of data dependencies (across countries and time) in our
estimation method.
Table 3 reports further descriptive statistics regarding the publication quality and
the number of firms investigated in the primary studies. In total, the study sample
comprises 73,387 firm observations with 52.50% hedging and 47.50% non-hedging
firms. This sample includes 70.45% published articles and 29.55% unpublished
working papers, doctoral dissertations and conference proceedings. The study
quality measured by the journal ranking of the German Academic Association for
Business Research (VHB) indicates that about a third of the observations is
extracted from leading and important business research journals. As an alternative,
the Scientific Journal Ranking (SJR) reveals a similar distribution when dividing the
sample into journals having a SJR ranking above (below) 1. Therefore, it appears
discussable why considering a large proportion of low-quality studies in our meta-
analysis. We explicitly include these studies in the sample due to the following
reasons. First, the inclusion of unpublished and low-quality studies leads to a
broader and more comprehensive sample covering multiple countries and time
periods. This approach significantly enhances the power of our meta-analytical
findings (Whiston and Li 2011). As the exclusion of the studies dramatically reduces
our sample, it would not be possible to conduct multivariate meta-analysis for all
fourteen proxy variables. Second, we explicitly account for study quality in our
analysis. Within the multivariate meta-analysis, the weighting approach (see matrix
Si in Eq. 1) is based on the within-study variation, i.e. observations from low-
quality studies with small sample sizes and thus larger variation in their estimates
receive a lower weight in the analysis. Third, excluding unpublished studies would
reduce the observed time period, as new studies that might not have gone through
the referee process would be excluded. Moreover, ‘low-quality’ studies often focus
on firms from other countries than the US. Excluding these articles would lead to a
strong country-level clustering in our observations because a larger fraction of
findings would refer to US firms. Fourth, we conduct a robustness tests via meta-
regression analysis, which explicitly models the impact of publication quality on the
reported results.
15 This is mostly driven by the better availability of corporate hedging data for large firms.
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5 Empirical results
We aggregate the reported effects for the hedging determinants across our sample of
132 primary studies using multivariate meta-analysis.16 In the following section, we
first address the issue of between-study variation in more detail, because this is
important for the question of using a fixed or random effects model in our analysis.
Afterwards, we present our main results for each of the four hedging hypotheses.
For each proxy variable we examine the null hypothesis of no relationship with the
Fig. 1 Distribution of sample observations over time and over world regions. The plot in the left column
shows the distribution of the sample start year of each study included in the sample. The pie graph in the
right column depicts the distribution of the countries covered by the primary studies. ‘Multi’ refers to
studies examining more than one country.
Table 3 Sample description
Criteria Statistic





Total number of firms 73,387
Proportion of hedging firms (non-hedging firms) 52.50% (47.50%)
Publication type and study quality
Published studies (unpublished studies) 70.45% (29.55%)
VHB-JOURQUAL 3 ranking A?, A, or B (ranking C or not ranked) 31.82% (68.18%)
SJR ranking above 1.0 (SJR ranking equal to or below 1.0) 36.36% (63.64%)
This table presents descriptive statistics regarding the number of firms examined in the primary stud-
ies and the publication characteristics.
16 Please refer to Online Appendix D for the results from vote counting following the approach by Aretz
and Bartram (2010) and univariate analysis following Arnold et al. (2014).
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hedging dummy variable. Further, we describe the findings from the analysis of
heterogeneity. Therein, we test for the impact of study quality, time effects, and
regional differences. Moreover, we explicitly analyze potential biases through data
mining or publication selection at the end of this section.
5.1 Multivariate meta-analysis
For the correct specification of the multivariate model, one main aspect of meta-
analysis is the detection and consideration of between-study variation. As the effect
sizes are collected from studies examining data from different countries and time
periods, it would be problematic to assume that there is one single underlying
population effect across all studies in our sample (Borenstein et al. 2009; Card 2012;
Lipsey and Wilson 2001). In the case of heterogeneity, the effect size variation is
not only driven by sampling error but also by variation between studies. For
example, country-specific regulation or firm characteristics influence the true effect
size, although the initial decision to hedge is the same. The Cochran’s Q-test is a
commonly applied test for heterogeneity in meta-analysis that measures the excess
variation beyond sampling error. The Q-test results in a test statistic of 41,056,17
which obviously leads to a rejection of the null hypothesis of homogenous effect
sizes at all common significance levels. We consider this aspect of heterogeneous
effect sizes by applying random effects estimation, which explicitly accounts for the
between-study variation.
The estimates of the linear model estimated by multivariate meta-analysis are
displayed in Table 4.18 Regarding the corporate tax hypothesis (H1), the results
reveal weak empirical evidence. The aggregated effect for tax-loss carry forwards is
0.0711 and slightly significant at the 10% level (p-value is 0.0956). The positive
sign of the estimate indicates that hedging companies can better time the use of tax-
loss carry forwards, which results from the reduction in cash flow volatility hedging.
This leads to an increase in the present value of tax preference items (Géczy et al.
1997).
The proxy variables used to test the bankruptcy and financial distress costs
hypothesis (H2) show high significance levels for the influence of dividend yield
(b ¼ 0:0741; p ¼ 0:0202), liquidity (b ¼ 0:0893; p ¼ 0:0108), and firm size
(b ¼ 0:2148; p ¼ 0:0002). The estimate for firm size is the dominating effect in
terms of statistical and economic significance. The positive sign of the size effect
provides evidence that economies of scale are highly relevant for hedging firms. The
finding that more liquid firms tend to hedge less is in line with theoretical
predictions that financial liquidity enables greater flexibility in meeting financial
requirements, which helps to mitigate financial distress costs. Consequentially, cash
management can help to build a financial buffer acting as a substitute for hedging
(Géczy et al. 1997). Moreover, the results show that corporate dividend policy
17 The test statistic is approximately Chi-squared distributed with 1,522 degrees of freedom.
18 The corresponding random effects mean correlation matrix calculated by Eq. (1) (which serves as
input for the linear model) can be found in Online Appendix E.
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influences corporate hedging behavior. The positive aggregated effect for dividend
yield can be explained by the fact that higher dividend payments lower the
availability of internal funds required for payments to fixed claimholders, which
leads to raising expected costs of financial distress (Nance et al. 1993). In addition,
Kalay (1982) argues that higher dividend payouts introduce underinvestment
problems and associated costs occurring from agency conflicts between sharehold-
ers and bondholders. Therefore, firms offering higher dividend payments to their
shareholders have more incentives to engage in hedging to avoid distress costs and
underinvestment problems. The findings for liquidity and dividend yield also
pronounce the important interactions between hedging and other corporate financial
decisions, namely cash management and dividend policy.
Regarding the coordination of financing and investment policy and agency conflicts
of debt hypothesis (H4), the results show ambiguous empirical evidence. The estimated
mean effects reveal a positive relation between R&D expenses and corporate hedging,
which confirms the hypothesized direction (b ¼ 0:0910; p ¼ 0:0541). As R&D
expensesmeasure the availability of growth options in a firm’s investment opportunity
set, firms with greater R&D expenses can benefit more from the risk reduction of
corporate hedging through lower risk of underinvestment problems and associated
agency costs (Choi et al. 2013). In addition, neither capital expenditures for property,
plant and investment, nor Tobin’s Q show significant results at any conventional
levels.
5.2 Further analyses
To verify the robustness of our multivariate results, we perform two groups of
additional tests: (1) investigation of data mining bias, (2) analysis of publication
bias and exploration of heterogeneity.
5.2.1 Data mining bias
First, we account for the fact that primary studies use different definitions for the
examined proxy variables. Due to the large amount of emerging primary studies,
this effect is even amplified. By using the testing methodology developed by Harvey
et al. (2016), we consider the so-called data mining bias. In this manner, we account
for the fact that various alternative variable definitions are used for the proxy
variables. This large variety of definitions might by reasoned by an opportunistic
behavior of researchers to favor certain findings. The corresponding results of the
test are displayed in Table 5.
As an assumption for this test, we suppose that authors select the variable
definitions of the proxies to reach significant results. This means, the larger the
variety of different variable definitions for the same proxy variable, the higher the
risk of biased primary studies’ results driven by data-mining activities. To control
for an overestimation of the multivariate effects arising from data-mining, we have
to accommodate the test statistics of our results. Therefore, we calculate an adjusted
5% significance level for each proxy variable to get a more conservative limit. In the
case of a high number of different variable definitions in relation to the number of
16 Business Research (2018) 11:1–31
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effect size observations, the probability level is diminished in order to provide a
more conservative significance level. For example, the significance level for
dividend yield decreases from 5 to 2.17%. In some cases, the variable definitions are
quite consistent across the sample of effect sizes, which leads to an increasing
probability level (larger than 5%). For a conservative estimation, we leave these
probability levels at 5% instead of increasing them as, for example, in the case of
tax-loss carry forwards. As a result from this robustness test, it appears that our
strongly significant findings are not affected by data mining bias as these estimates
are still significant even when applying the more conservative, adjusted significance
levels. For example, in the case of dividend yield, the 5% significance level is
adjusted to 2.17%, due to 7 different variable definitions used in 41 studies.
However, the estimated p-value for dividend yield (p ¼ 0:0202) is still significant at
the adjusted significance level. The same conclusions hold for liquidity and firm
size.
Table 4 Statistical results from multivariate meta-analysis
Proxy variable Hyp. sign No. of firms b SE(b) p-value
Corporate taxes (H1)
Tax-loss carry forwards ? 12,529 0.0711 0.0427 0.0956*
Bankruptcy and financial distress costs (H2)
Dividend yield ? 17,038 0.0741 0.0319 0.0202**
Interest coverage ratio - 16,187 -0.0127 0.0404 0.7530
Leverage ratio ? 51,866 0.0302 0.0269 0.2607
Liquidity - 33,767 -0.0893 0.0350 0.0108**
Profitability - 33,308 0.0751 0.0604 0.2135
Firm size ? 52,667 0.2148 0.0574 0.0002***
Tangible assets - 11,938 0.0715 0.0611 0.2425
Asymmetric information and agency conflicts of equity (H3)
Institutional investors - 18,040 0.0869 0.0559 0.1203
Option ownership ? 13,026 -0.0279 0.0442 0.5275
Share ownership ? 13,643 -0.0421 0.0335 0.2091
Coordination of financing and investment policy and agency conflicts of debt (H4)
Capex ? 25,482 -0.0263 0.0262 0.3169
R&D expenses ? 28,770 0.0910 0.0472 0.0541*
Tobin’s Q ? 38,937 0.0433 0.0327 0.1856
This table shows the results for the proxy variables used to test the corporate hedging hypotheses in a
multivariate meta-analysis. Names of the proxy variables are listed in the first column, and the second
column shows the specific hypothesized sign; the third column shows the number of firm observations
summed up from the primary studies testing the respective proxy variable. Next, the results from mul-
tivariate meta-analysis are presented. Using the standardized regression slopes b from the multivariate
linear model and their standard deviations SE(b) for each proxy variable, we calculate the z-statistic and
the corresponding p-value to test the null hypotheses of bi ¼ 0:
*, ** and *** indicate the rejection of the null hypotheses at the 10, 5, and 1% probability levels.
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5.2.2 Publication bias and analysis of heterogeneity
In this section, we test the heterogeneity of our dataset using a similar approach as
presented by Carney et al. (2011). Consequently, we analyze and control for
systematic differences in the reported effect sizes via multiple meta-regression
analysis following recent publications in economics and finance (among others,
Carney et al. 2011; Feld et al. 2013; Hang et al. 2017; Havranek and Irsova 2011).
This step should serve as a verification that the aggregation of reported results in the
multivariate meta-analysis is appropriate. Analogous to the work of Carney et al.
(2011), this procedure especially allows us to examine the impact of overlapping
firms and time periods in our sample.
As dependent variable in the meta-regression, we investigate the effect size
estimates measuring the direct effect of the proxy variable on the hedging dummy
variable. For each effect size, we consider the impact of study quality, observation
period, regional effects, and publication bias as explanatory variables in a regression
model. In this regard, the number of citations is calculated as the logarithm of
[(Google Scholar citations)/(age of the study) ? 1].19 The number of citations is
chosen as a criteria for study quality, as it considers study-specific quality
characteristics and is available for all studies including unpublished papers. Second,
to consider potential temporal variations due to regulatory changes or the
development of financial markets, the mean observation year of each primary
study sample is integrated in the analysis. Third, as a remarkable part of literature
examines hedging data from US firms, we include a dummy variable that indicates
whether a study uses data from North America (=1 for North America studies, zero
otherwise).
Finally, we investigate the existence of a potential publication selection bias in
the reported results. Publication selection arises when researchers favor results
based on their statistical significance or because they are consistent with the
majority of literature (Card and Krueger 1995). This biasing effect may distort
statistical inferences and especially averaged effects from meta-analysis. As
commonly included in meta-regression analysis research, our model consequently
contains the standard deviation of the effect sizes (m) as explanatory variable
(Doucouliagos and Laroche 2009; Stanley 2004). A significant regression coeffi-
cient for the effect size’s standard error would imply that positive (negative)
outcomes are more frequently reported than negative (positive) ones, due to a
subjective selection of results (Stanley and Doucouliagos 2012). This test procedure
follows the idea of the Egger’s test (Egger et al. 1997). Overall, the general meta-
regression model can be formularized as
zij ¼ b0 þ b1mþ b2Citationsþ b3North America þ b4 Mean year þ eij ð3Þ
with the error term following a normal distribution with an expected value of zero
and a variance set to the variance of the effect sizes according to
19 The number of citations was collected on January 13, 2017.
20 Business Research (2018) 11:1–31
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eij Nð0; m2ijÞ: ð4Þ
The estimated regression coefficients b1;...;4 measure the explanatory power of the
independent variables for the variation of the z-transformed correlation coefficients.
Thus, they indicate whether a certain variable systematically influences the reported
results. For example, a significant positive effect for b3 could be interpreted as
finding that studies with US data, on average, report larger effects for a certain
hedging determinant than non-US studies.
Table 6 reports the results for the meta-regression model including the four
explanatory variables. The results show that the explanatory variables do not reveal
a significant pattern across the various determinants of corporate hedging.20 For the
standard deviation as a test for publication bias, we observe significant values for
interest coverage ratio with a coefficient of 1.8619, for capital expenditure with a
coefficient of -1.1952, and for R&D with a coefficient of 1.7484, all significant at
5%. This finding allows us to conclude that the reported effect sizes tend to be
biased in the way that authors favor to report positive effects for interest coverage
ratio and R&D, and to report negative effects for Capex. Nevertheless, our main
conclusions for tax-loss carry forwards, dividend yield, liquidity, and size are not
distorted by selective reporting.
Moreover, we find no explanatory power for the number of study citations. This
indicates that study quality captured by the number of citations has no systematic
impact on the reported results. Furthermore, for the North America dummy, the
results reveal a significant effect for leverage at the 5% level (bLeverage3 = -0.1375).
This means that the relation between capital structure and corporate hedging is
diminished in North America studies compared to studies examining firm data from
the rest of the world, where the effect tends to be more in line with the hypothesized
positive sign. Additionally, we reveal significant temporal differences at the 5%
level for tangible assets with a coefficient of -0.0679 and R&D with a coefficient of
-0.0112. According to the empirical signs derived from multivariate analysis, the
impact of tangible assets on the decision to hedge becomes less apparent over time.
Furthermore, studies covering more recent data tend to report lower effect sizes for
R&D expenses.
6 Discussion
In this section, we first compare our main results with the ten leading primary
studies included in our sample.21 These studies are Allayannis and Weston (2001),
Campello et al. (2011), Choi et al. (2015), Donohoe (2015), Géczy et al. (1997), Jin
and Jorion (2006), Nance et al. (1993), Pérez-González and Yun (2013), Pincus and
Rajgopal (2002), Tufano (1996), which can be seen as representatives of
20 In addition to a mixed effects multilevel model as displayed in Table 6, we also applied a simple
ordinary least squares model as shown in Online Appendix F. Overall, both models show quite similar
results.
21 For the selection of studies we used the VHB-JOURQUAL3 and incorporate studies, which are
classified as A?.
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the empirical literature in this field of research. The studies cover firm data for the
time period from 1993 to 2015. Furthermore, we compare the results with the
existing (univariate) reviews by Aretz and Bartram (2010) and Arnold et al. (2014).
The univariate results reported in these studies are contrasted with the findings of
our multivariate meta-analysis as outlined in Table 7.
For the corporate tax hypothesis (H1), we are generally in line with existing
literature. All studies in our comparison testing this variable do not find a strongly
significant effect.
The bankruptcy and financial distress costs hypothesis (H2) represents the most
frequently confirmed hedging hypothesis. For dividend yield, our finding of a
positive effect is also confirmed by two of five primary studies as well as by Arnold
et al. (2014). For leverage, five of ten primary studies and the two reviews state a
significantly positive effect. In this case, our estimates contradict with the majority
of studies. These deviations might be driven by a notable endogeneity between
capital structure and the decision to hedge, as corporate hedging might also be seen
as the starting point of the capital structure decision (Bartram et al. 2009; Lin and
Smith 2007; Lin et al. 2008). For liquidity, we reveal a negative association with the
decision to hedge, which is only in line with the findings reported in Pincus and
Rajgopal (2002) and the two previous reviews. The other studies do not find a
significant effect for this hedging determinant.
For the asymmetric information and agency conflicts of equity hypothesis (H3)
the picture is the same as for the coordination of financing and investment policy
and agency conflicts of debt hypothesis (H4). For both theories, existing studies
partially proclaim strong evidence, which is not confirmed by our multivariate
results. Deviations of our results exist in terms of institutional investors and R&D
expenses. In both cases, four studies confirm a significantly positive association with
the hedging dummy variable, which might be specifically driven by spurious effects
in the correlational data we collected as effect sizes.
A further aspect that becomes apparent from Table 7 is that the choice of the
investigated hedging determinants differs across primary studies. This might drive
the deviating results through misspecification bias. Kirkham et al. (2012) find out in
their simulation study that the multivariate approach as applied in this paper is a
method to lower the effect of the publication bias and misspecification bias on the
aggregated effect sizes. Frosi et al. (2014) come to a similar conclusion and state
that this is especially true in the case of missing outcomes in the primary studies,
which underlines the validity of our multivariate results and supports the approach
to be used in further applications. Both references clearly point out the added value
of the ‘borrowing of strength’-mechanism to the summary effect sizes in the
multivariate meta-analysis, which means that ‘one can learn about unreported
outcomes through the reported results for other correlated outcomes’ (Frosi et al.
2014: 2).
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7 Conclusion
This paper provides new evidence on the determinants of corporate hedging by taking a
meta-level look at the following hedging hypotheses: corporate tax, bankruptcy and
financial distress costs, asymmetric information and agency conflicts of equity,
coordinationoffinancing and investment policy and agency conflicts of debt. The results
of the multivariate meta-analysis indicate that hedging firms are larger companies with
lower level of financial liquidity and higher dividend payouts than non-hedging firms.
In comparison to existing reviews byAretz andBartram (2010) andArnold et al. (2014),
we can conclude that univariate meta-analysis tends to overestimate results, since this
approach neglects the dependencies among the proxy variables and does not allow to
investigate the heterogeneity among the effect estimates. For this reason, the results of
our multivariate meta-analysis do not confirm their results, for example, regarding the
impact of leverage ratio, institutional investors, and profitability on corporate hedging
decisions. In addition to the multivariate meta-analysis, we also conduct a meta-
regression analysis to explore the heterogeneity between the estimates reported in
primary studies. Here, we find that studies analyzing firms from North America report,
on average, a lower impact of leverage on the corporate hedging decision. Moreover,
studies examining more recent data samples tend to find a weaker relation between
tangible assets and hedging, R&D and hedging respectively.
Despite its power to model interrelations between multiple effect sizes, there are
several issues to be critically considered when conducting a (multivariate) meta-
analysis and interpreting its results. Limiting factors, which are incorporated only in
few primary studies, comprise the ‘endogeneity and identification problems’ as well
as ‘empirical modeling of structural relations’ as emphasized by Aretz and Bartram
(2010). This means that the causality of the variables is not unique. For example,
many determinants of leverage also influence hedging strategies and vice versa. A
promising methodology to address the problem of endogeneity in a meta-analysis
using secondary data is the meta-analytic structural equation modeling (MASEM)
approach presented by Cheung and Chan (2005). If a combined correlation matrix
(similar to the GLS estimator presented in this paper) can be generated, this pooled
correlation matrix could then be used as input for a structural equation model.
Furthermore, it should be considered that possible nonlinearities in the dependency
structure are not captured by our multidimensional model. Incorporating such
specific effects, however, requires a deep understanding of the dependencies as well
as moving away from the modeling as it is performed in the majority of existing
primary studies. These aspects open perspectives for future research.
Finally, our results suggest that classical financial theories do not seem to fully
explain the first order concerns of corporate hedging in practice. For this reason, we
encourage academics to widen their empirical work towards the analysis of more
recent theoretical developments of classical financial theory as, for example, the
influence of the time horizon on the hedging motivation of financially distressed firms
(Kürsten and Linde 2011), hedging as a consequence of good corporate governance
(Lel 2012), as well as behavioristic theories like, for example, the managerial
overconfidence hypothesis (Adam et al. 2015).
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Smith, Clifford W., and René M. Stulz. 1985. The determinants of firms’ hedging policies. Journal of
Financial and Quantitative Analysis 20 (4): 391–405. doi:10.2307/2330757.
Stanley, Tom D. 2004. Does unemployment hysteresis falsify the natural rate hypothesis? a meta-
regression analysis. Journal of Economic Surveys. doi:10.1111/j.0950-0804.2004.00231.x.
Stanley, Tom D., and Hristos Doucouliagos. 2012. Meta-regression analysis in economics and business.
Abingdon: Routledge.
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